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COMMENTS
Symposium: Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
INTRODUCTION

The uninsured motorist endorsement to the automobile insurance
policy is a form of first party insurance designed to protect persons injured in automobile accidents from losses which, because of the tortfeasors lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.
This relatively new endorsement, which has been widely accepted by
the motoring public, has given rise to problems of interpretation, not
only because of its unique character but also because of the innumerable
situations that have arisen wherein the coverage is applicable.
The authors, now members of the Wisconsin Bar, prepared these
papers while enrolled, as students, in the 1970 Liability Insurance Seminar at Marquette University Law School. The areas examined by the
authors merit the attention of the bench, the bar and the insurance industry, since they treat troublesome segments of the uninsured motorist
endorsement.
Mr. Greenwald, in his article, "An Examination of the Meaning and
Scope of the Basis of the Uninsured Motorist Policy Endorsement:
'All Sums the Insured is Legally Entitled to Recover,"' examines what
benefits are to be paid under the endorsement. Mr. Mlakar, in his comment, "The Uninsured Automobile" deals with the meaning and scope
of the definition of the uninsured automobile. Mr. Olson examines
the scope and validity of the exclusion section of the UM policy and
compares it with other provisions of the standard automobile policy in
a comment entitled, "The Exclusions Section of the UninsuredMotorist
Endorsement of the Automobile Insurance Policy." Mr. Gass, in his
comment, "The Meaning, Scope and Validity of the 'Other Insurance'
Provisionswhich Apply to the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement," considers the impact of other insurance, botli UM coverage and general
liability coverage, on the benefits to be awarded under the UM endorsement. Mr. Chartier in his comment, "Arbitration: Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement," attempts to give a general overview of the arbitration
provision, a unique feature which has given rise to numerous questions
of interpretation.
JAMES D. GiraAa:I*

* Professor of Law, Marquette University; Research Director, Defense Research

Institute; President, Wisconsin State Bar; Member, Rouse of Delegates,
American Bar Association; Fellow of the American Bar Foundation; Director,
American Judicature Society.
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE MEANING AND SCOPE
OF THE BASIS OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST
POLICY ENDORSEMENT:
"ALL SUMS THE INSURED IS LEGALLY
ENTITLED TO RECOVER"
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Public Demand for Minimization of Loss Resulting from Automobile Accidents.
The automobile is perhaps the most expensive product the American
consumer can purchase. For example, added onto the sale price is the
cost of highways, maintenance and fuel, parking-storage facilities, pollution, insurance, and non-compensated losses resulting from automobile
accidents. The public has complained more about the last two than any
other. The Uninsured Motorist endorsement is a result of those complaints.
Since the birth of the assembly line automobile, the accident toll,
in lives and dollars, has spiraled without indication of a slow-downeven in an age where a service module of an Appollo XIII can explode
50,000 miles from the atmosphere of the Earth, yet continue on its
journey around the Moon and then land safely back on Earth without
injury to its occupants.
It was not long after Henry Ford sold his first Model T that the
question arose as to how to compensate automobile accident victims.
The laws controlling compensation for bodily injury and property damage caused by acts of a person other than the victim controlled compensation. In order to spread the loss from individuals to those who used
the automobile as a group, automobile liability insurance was introduced.
Once the victim successfully obtained a judgment against the negligent
operator, the operator's insurer would compensate the victim for his
losses up to the limits of the insurance contract. However, this scheme
of spreading loss, or even of awarding compensation to the victim of
another's tortious conduct, did not operate where the tortfeasor was
without liability coverage and was otherwise financially irresponsible.
The post-World War II boom witnessed a rapid expansion of the
number of automobiles on America's highways and in America's urban
areas. Concomitant with this increase was an increase in the incidence
of accidents. (During the years of 1958-67 the number of deaths and
personal injuries increased 43.6% and 48.7% respectively.)' As the
incidence of ownership of motor vehicles and the correspondent accidents spiraled, the threat of loss due to a financially irresponsible
motorist increased proportionately. It was not long before the legislatures and government officials-both state and federal-began a search
1Insuring the Automobile, How the Present System Works, Insurance In-

formation Institute (1968).
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for an effective control of the increasing losses to victims of the negli2
gent and irresponsible motorist.
B. Legislation to Minimize Loss.
Prior to the introduction of the Uninsured Motorist endorsement,
the solutions adopted by state governments to ease the problem of loss
were aimed only at encouraging all motorists to purchase and keep in
effect liability insurance. This type of legislation can be divided into two
classes-Financial Responsibility laws and Compulsory Insurance laws.
1. Financial Responsibility Laws.
The Wisconsin Financial Responsibility Act,3 typical of similar
laws in the other states, is divided into two general sections, the first
section commonly referred to as "security for past accidents,"4 and the
second section commonly referred to as "financial responsibility for the
future."5 Under the first section a motorist involved in an accident is
required to furnish the state with proof that he is financially responsible
for any judgment for damages resulting from such accident, or face
suspension of his operator's permit until able to do so. A valid and
enforceable liability policy, in effect at the time of the accident, with
limits meeting statutory minimums (15/30/5 in Wisconsin 6) will meet
the requirements. The second classification requires a motorist who
has been involved in an accident and has an unsatisfied judgment against
him, 7 or has had his license revoked, to furnish proof of financial re-

sponsibility. Upon the filing of a valid automobile liability insurance
policy, the operator will meet the requirements necessary under the Act
to entitle him to have his license renewed.. 9
Financial responsibility laws, however, leave several gaps in the
ideal of complete compensation to accident victims. In a compensation
system based upon fault, the injured party can only receive compensation if the negligent party is financially responsible. The irresponsible
motorist is not required to become responsible until he has had one accident (or has exhibited such poor driving methods that he has had his
license revoked, in which case he probably has already been in an accident). Therefore, the victims of his "free" accident remain uncompensated. The second gap is created where the irresponsible motorist ac2State governments had been searching for the last forty years to cure this
problem. In 1925 the first financial responsibility law was passed in Connecticut and in the same year, the first compulsory insurance plan, requiring all
motorists to acquire liability insurance as a prerequisite to registration of
their automobiles, was introduced and passed into law in Massachusetts. A.
WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 45 (1969).
WIs. STAT. Ch. 344 (1967).
4 Wis. STAT. §§ 344.12-344.22 (1967).
5 WIS. STAT. §§ 344.24-344.41 (1967).
6 W is. STAT. § 344.15 (1967) as amended by Wis. Laws of 1969.
7WIs. STAT. § 344.25 (1967).
S WIS. STAT. § 344.35 (1967) as amended by Wis. Laws of 1969.
9WIs. STAT. § 344.30 (1967).
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quires insurance in accordance with the financial responsibility laws,
but then, after full compliance with such laws, permits the insurance
to lapse and again becomes uninsured. A third situation arises where
the negligent operator had a valid liability insurance policy at the time
of an accident but after the accident did not cooperate with his insurer
or acted in a manner which would permit the insurance company to
deny coverage. The victim again would go uncompensated.
2. Compulsory Insurance Laws.
A second solution to the problems created by the irresponsible motorist, adopted by some state legislatures, is compulsory insurance. These
laws, adopted in only three states, ° generally provide that no registration of a motor vehicle may be accepted without proof that a policy of
liability insurance has been issued to the owner of the vehicle. Theoretically then, since each car on the road must be licensed, every car will
be an insured automobile. If there is an accident, each victim will be
compensated. Theory never succeeds, and in the case of compulsory
insurance, larger gaps than those felt by the inadequacies of financial
responsibility laws exist. There is no effective way to administer the
law to compel each operator of a motor vehicle to keep the insurance
in force once the automobile has been registered. There is also the
problem of the operator who simply does not license his automobile. The
amount of "free accidents" a driver receives under this type of legislation is limitless, while there is at least some control under the financial
responsibility laws.
Neither type of legislation can cover the situation where an unlicensed driver operates another's car without permission.:" Nor does
either type cover the situation where the negligent operator drives away
from the scene of the accident and his identity remains unknown. Unless
the victim of an accident caused by the negligent acts of a financially irresponsible motorist has insurance specifically protecting him from such
risks, there is a high degree of probability that he will be uncompensated
for his loss.
C. Insurance Protecting an Injured Party from Loss Caused by an
IrresponsibleMotorist.
Insurance coverage which assumes the risk of loss caused by an
uninsured motorist does exist. Such coverage has appeared in three
ch. 175 § 113A (1959); New York: N.Y.
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAWS § 312 (McKinney 1960); North Carolina: N.C.
GEN. STATS. §§ 20-309 through 20-319 (1965).
11 In such case, even if the owner of the automobile has been issued a liability
policy with a broad omnibus clause as required by state statute, the policy
will not apply and the vehicle will be an uninsured vehicle. See Wis. STAT. §
204.30(3) (1967); Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage A-Bodily
10 Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws

Injury Liability; Coverage B-Property Damage Liability; State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. Policy, Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability; Coverage BProperty Damage Liability.
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forms: (1) Unsatisfied judgment Funds; (2) Unsatisfiied Judgment
Insurance; and (3) the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement in automobile
accident insurance policies.
1. Unsatisfied judgment Funds.
The Unsatisfiied judgment Funds, pioneered in Manitoba, Canada,2
and followed in the United States by North Dakota,'13 Maryland, 14
Michigan,'15 New Jersey,16 and New York,' 7 generally provide that a
fee is paid by each owner of an automobile to a state controlled fund
from which a resident, who has secured in a state court an unsatisfied
judgment arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, may obtain
limited compensation.
2. Unsatisfied judgment Insurance.
Privately owned insurance companies have offered insurance identical to that provided by the Unsatisfied Judgment Funds in states in
which there is no state fund.s Again, this provides limited compensation according to a schedule. It also requires that the victim first obtain
a judgment against the negligent motorist, and then attempt execution
upon the judgment. Because a prior suit is necessary before coverage can
be realized, the insured will be no better off than if he had not purchased
such insurance where he is unable, or it is highly impracticable, to obtain
jurisdiction over the negligent motorist. If the insured is able to bring
suit, the insurer will be subjected to the risks of a default judgment, thereby encouraging fraudulent claims.' 9 Possibly because of the
above situations, neither the insurance companies nor the motoring
public have contracted extensively for such coverage.
3. The Development of Uninsured Motorist Insurance
After World War II, the public and legislators demanded a more
effective compensation system to protect victims of automobile accidents.
Many state legislators introduced compulsory insurance legislation.
However, the continuing presence of uninsured motorists in the states
that had adopted compulsory insurance laws disclosed the inadequacy
2 For an informative book on the Manitoba legislation and similar legislation
enacted in other Canadian Provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island) see V. HALMAN,
UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FUNDS

(1968).

N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 39-17-01 (Supp. 1957).
14 Md. ANN. CODE, Art 661/2, §§ 150-79 (1957).
15 MicH. Comms. LAws, §§ 257.1101-31 (Supp. 1965).
16 N.J. STAT. ANN., §§ 6-612-91 (Supp. 1957).
'7 N.Y. INS. LAW, §§ 600-26 (McKinney 1959); see also, WiDiss, A GUIDE TO
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE R, fn. 16-18 (1969).
18 This insurance was first offered in 1925 by the Untilities Indem. Exchange.
WiDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 13 fn. 26 (1969).
19 In order to prevent fraud, the insurance companies required as a condition
precedent to recovery that the insured had to prosecute to judgment in a suit
without default. This measure was neither practicable nor workable. Both the
insurance companies and their insureds were dissatisfied with such an arrangement.
'3
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of such legislation. The demand for an effective system could not be
satisfied by legislation which attempted to "control" the uninsured motorist. The adoption of "no-fault" plans such as the "Saskatchewan"
plan evidenced this new trend, as did the revitalization of interest in
the infamous "Columbia Report" which was published in 1933.1
By 1954, "The clamor of sociologists .... the threat of legislators to

enact compulsory insurance laws, and fear of the insurance companies
that they would be forced to underwrite the undesirable risk"2 2 influenced the insurance industry to devise a compensation plan which would
provide more effective protection to its insureds who were innocent
victims of an irresponsible driver. In 1955 the National Bureau of Underwriters promulgated the standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. 3 Shortly after its introduction, various states passed statutes
requiring that the new provision at least be offered with every automo24
bile liability policy issued in the particular state.

II.

NATURE OF UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCECOMPARISON WITH OTHER PROVISIONS

A. Operationof UninsuredMotorist Endorsement.
The Uninsured Motorist endorsement was designed to compensate
the insured for loss suffered due to the fault of a driver not covered by
20 For a general discussion of this demand see, Widiss, Perspectives On Unin-

sured Motorist Coverage, 62 N.W. L. REV. 497 (1967). For example, 80-85%
of the drivers in New York carried liability insurance in the 1950's. Nevertheless, the loss attributable to uninsured motorists in that state exceeded
$7,000,000 per year. WIDISs, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 10
(1969).
21 Wiwiss, supra note 20 at 10. The Columbia report was the first work published advocating a "no-fault" insurance plan. See, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUMBIA L. REv. 785 (1932).
22 H. Hentmann, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 66 (1963);
see also, fn. 6 of this article.
23 Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969);
see also, WIDISs, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 14 fn. 32 (1969).
24 Wisconsin, in 1965, adopted such a statute. Wis. Laws 1965 ch. 486, sec. 1
codified as Wis. STAT. § 204.30(5) (1967). The statute is similar to that of
most states, but provided that, although the insurer must offer the coverage,
the insured can choose not to purchase it:
204.30(5) UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE. (a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by
a person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless
coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily
injury or death in the amount of at least $15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident [By amendment to this section by Wis. Laws of 1969 ch. 165 the
limits were increased from 10/20] under provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles, because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. The named insured has the right to reject such coverage. ...
By 1968, 46 states had passed an uninsured motorist law. For a list of states
see, J. Corbley, Uninsured Motorist Protection, DRI Monograph (1968), Appendix A.
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liability insurance as if the uninsured motorist was in fact insured in
25
accordance with the state financial responsibility law requirements.
After an accident in which the insured has been injured, the insurer and
the insured are required to settle the claim, or if they fail to agree, to
arbitrate. Once the insurer has compensated the victim, the insurer
becomes subrogated to the rights of the insured against the uninsured
motorist. In this manner the insured may recover from his own
insurer "all sums which he is legally entitled to recover as damages
from an uninsured motorist." Theoretically responsible drivers are
thereby protected from the irresponsible driver.
B. Comparison of the Uninsured Motorist With Other Endorsement.
The standard Family Combination Automobile Policy is composed
of four basic insuring endorsements:
(1) Liability Coverage;
(2) Property Damage Coverage;
(3) Medical Payments Coverage;
(5) Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
Each part provides for payment to or on behalf of the insured. However, the nature of the type of protection is not identical as is evidenced
by the language in each section comprising the basis of the separate
insuring agreements.
1. Liability Coverage
In the liability endorsement the insurer agrees
".... To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ... "
The benefits of such insurance accrue to someone other than the insured
where such person has suffered damages resulting from the insured's
negligent conduct (fault). This type of insurance is generally regarded
as "third party" insurance. The company is not liable on the policy
until a judgment is rendered against its insured, or the company,
which defends any action against the insured, reaches a settlement
2
agreement with the injured party.
25

26

6

Generally, if a motorist is an insured under a liability policy in which it has
limits that are equal to or greater than the minimum limits of liability required by Financial Responsibility laws, then an injured party is not entitled
to make a claim under his Uninsured Motorist Coverage. But in Porter v.
Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 12 Ariz. App. 2, 467 P.2d 77
(1970), the second division of the Court of Appeals of Arizona permitted
an insured to recover under his Uninsured Motorist Coverage where the
tortfeasor was underinsured. An underinsured motorist is one who is insured under a liability policy which has limits at least equal to those required
by the Financial Responsibility laws, but such insurance is not sufficient to
pay all injured parties in a multiple injury accident an amount equal to the
single limits required by law. In Porter five persons were injured in the
accident caused by a driver who had only a 10/20 liability policy ($10,000
limit per person, $20,000 limit per occurence). As a result, the plaintiff-insured only recovered $2,500 from the tortfeasor's liability carrier and was
left with $7,500 in unsatisfied damages. The Court of Appeals permitted the
plaintiff-insured to recover such amount from his Uninsured Motorist Carrier.
In Wisconsin the injured party can bring a direct action against the insurance
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2. Property Damage Coverage
In the standard Family Combination Automobile Policy, property
damage protection is divided into several subsections, the distinguishing
feature of each subsection being the nature of the cause of damage.
However, the basis of each insuring agreement is identical:
To pay to the insured for loss caused [by the particular cause]

to the owned or to a non-owned automobile...
The liability of the insurer is established without regard or consideration of "fault." Once the insured has established the amount of damages
resulting from a cause, the risk of which is covered under the policy,
the insured has a right to recover from the company in accordance with
the deductible provisions.
3. Medical Payments Coverage.
Under the insuring agreement the insurer promises
"To pay to the insured all reasonable expenses incurred within
one year from the date of accident ...

Similar to coverage for property damage, the liability of the insurer is
not based upon the fault of any party involved, but is in effect whenever
the insured establishes that he has incurred medical expenses as the
result of an accident. Like the property protection afforded above, it
is commonly referred to as "first party" insurance-payment is directly
to the insured for his loss.
4. Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
The Uninsured Motorist provision is a self-contained contract of
insurance with separate insuring agreements, definitions of terms used
in that agreement, and its own exclusions. It is "first party" insurance
to the extent that payment is directly to the insured for his loss. However, it is "third party" insurance to the extent that it is based on the
fault of one party and the freedom from fault of another party. The
language in the endorsement which constitutes the basis of the insuring agreement is a combination of the language found in the other provisions, indicating its hybrid character and nature:
.. To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages...32
The agreement is a contractual promise to pay-it is not free insurance for the uninsured motorist. Its only conditions are that the following must be established:
company without first bringing suit against the insured tortfeasor. Wis. STAT.
§ 260.11(1) (1967). However, the suit proceeds as if the defendant in the
action was the insured, whose negligence and liability to the plaintiff has not
yet been determined.
2 For a comprehensive examination of this endorsement see Pouros, Melendes
and Craig, Medical Payments Provision of the Automobile Insurance Policy,
52 MARQ. L. REv. 445 (1970).
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The alleged uninsured motorist was in fact uninsured;
The uninsured motorist was at fault;
The insured's conduct was free of contributory negligence;
The amount of damages suffered by the insured as a result
of bodily injury sustained in the accident;
(5) Compliance with the other conditions of the policy requiring notice, cooperation, and other matters;
(6) The accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of the uninsured motor vehicle.
III. INTERPRETATION PROBLEmS OF "LEGALLY ENTITLED"
A. Suit Against the UninsuredMotorist As Condition Precedent.
1. Generally
It has been argued that the phrase "legally entitled to recover"
requires, as a condition precedent, that the insured successfully secure a
judgment against the uninsured motorist. In Hill v. Seaboard Marine
Insurance Co.,28 the plaintiff was injured when an uninsured automobile
operated by an uninsured motorist, struck the rear of the car the plaintiff was operating. The insurer denied liability under the Uninsured
Motorist provision of the policy it had issued to the plaintiff. The
insured then brought an action against Seaboard to recover under such
provisions. At the trial the insurer unsuccessfully objected to the admission of evidence offered in order to establish the negligence of the
uninsured motorist. On appeal the objection was construed to be a contention that the insured must first bring an action against the uninsured
motorist before he may be entitled to recover against the insurer. The
appellate court, in rejecting this contention, stated that the policy
"clearly" did not permit such construction, and that the language "shall
be legally entitled to recover" did not convey such an intent when construed in favor of coverage. Furthermore, the court argued:
For decades insurance companies have been writing unsatisfied
judgment policies and are knowledgeable in the art of specifically
requiring an unsatisfied judgment as a condition precedent to
their liability and to a suit directly against the insurer, if that is
the insurer's intent. Here there is no language in the policy that
requires an unsatisfied judgment to establish legal liability or
the amount thereof, of the owner or operator of the uninsured
automobile.2 9
The court went on to declare that the proper action to be taken
by an insured who has been injured in a collision with an uninsured
motorist is an action against the insurance company.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Sahioff v. Western Casualty &
Surety Co., 0 concurred in theory that the insured need not obtain a
28 374

S.W.2d 606 (Mo.

29 Id. at 611.

App. 1963).

30 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969).
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judgment against the uninsured motorist before suing his insurer. The
court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Hallows, stated:
In fact, the uninsured motorist endorsement does not require suit
and expressly provides that no judgment against the uninsured
motorist is conclusive upon the insurer's interests unless the
action3 1by the insured was with the written consent of the insurer.

2. Requirement Upheld
Not only is it the minority position which upholds the insurer's
argument that the words "legally entitled" require the insured to prosecute to judgment the uninsured motorist prior to recovery against the
insurer, but the cases comprising the minority position have limited
operation. For example, Squire v. National Grange Mutual Insurance
Co. 3 2 did hold that recovery under uninsured motorist coverage is

conditional upon the establishment of legal liability through suit against
the uninsured motorist. However, an examination of the fact situation
before the court reveals more than the bare rule of law. In Squires
the plaintiffs, the executor and administrator of the deceased insured,
had recovered a judgment against two drivers who were racing their
cars on the highway when one of the cars collided with the car the
deceased insured was occupying. At the time of the accident each of
the racing motor vehicles was covered by a policy of insurance. However, by the time the trial against the two drivers was about to begin,
there was no insurance available-one liability carrier was removed on a
policy defense and the other liability carrier had gone into receivership.
Not until this time had the deceased's executor or administrator sent
notice of claim or the suit papers in the action against the negligent
motorists to the deceased's uninsured motorist carrier. The carrier denied liability on the basis of breach of a policy provision requiring submission to the insurer of the notice of claim as soon as practicable and
service of process upon the company at the commencement of any suit
against an uninsured motorist. In holding that the plaintiffs had complied with the policy provisions, the court buttressed its argument by
stating that the plaintiffs had to sue the motorists in order to establish
their legal liability. In this light, the rule appears to have been adopted
Id. at 66-67, 171 N.W.2d at 916. See also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Matlock, 446 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). (Nothing in recently passed
statute which required inclusion of Uninsured Motorist in all automobile
liability policies issued in the state, unless insurer specifically rejects such
coverage, required the insured to bring suit against the uninsured motorist
as condition precedent to recover from his insurer) ; Hickey v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 239 F.Supp. 109 (ED Tenn ND 1965) (Parties intention as
displayed in the policy, was to the issues between themselves, therefore the best
procedure to follow was to allow the insured to sue the insurer rather than
the uninsured motorist); Wortman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 227 F.
Supp. 460 (E.D. Ark. 1963) ; Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 354 P.2d
1085 (Okla. 1960); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Devose, 226 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962)
32145 S.E.2d 673 (1965).
31

19701
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to aid recovery, not as a reason for denying compensation for injury
casued by an uninsured motorist.
3. Effect of Invalidity of Compulsory Arbitration.
The enforceability of the arbitration provision 33 would appear
to have an important bearing on the issue of whether the insured
must obtain a judgment against the irresponsible motorist prior to
recovery on the policy in order to establish the uninsured's legal liability.
One of the reasons the insurance companies have inserted the arbitration clause is their fear that a jury, when faced with the duty to determine who is at fault in an automobile accident, will violate that duty
where the "poor and innocent" plaintiff is suing the "rich" insurance
company which has already been paid for the coverage it is denying.
However, the reported cases do not appear to be influenced by this
consideration and, even though they invalidate the compulsory arbitration provision, they hold that the insured can maintain an action against
his insurer without initially prosecuting the uninsured motorist.
In Wright v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York3 4 the plaintiff,
a passenger in an automobile driven by his daughter-in-law and owned
by his son, was injured when the automobile was struck from the rear
by a vehicle operated by an uninsured motorist. Fidelity had issued
an automobile liability policy containing the standard uninsured motorist endorsement to the plaintiff. That endorsement provided that if the
insured and the insurer could not agree on the claim, and if the insured
did not wish to arbitrate, then the only course that could be pursued
was an action against the insurance company. The Uninsured Motorist
endorsement in the policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
to the plaintiff's son did not contain the alternative to arbitration-it
was similar to the standard clause making arbitration compulsory. Both
of the insurance companies demurred on the basis that there must be a
prior determination of legal liability on the part of the uninsured motorist. Both demurrers were sustained by the trial court. On appeal it was
held that it was error to sustain either demurrer. The demurrer of Fidelity should have been overruled because the contract itself provided
that the disputes between the insurer and insured could be determined
by suit against the company at the election of the insured. In reversing
the order sustaining Liberty's demurrer, the court held that the compulsory arbitration provision was invalid because it ousted the jurisdiction
of the court to determine liability and damages. On the basis of Williams
v. Nationwide Insurance Co.,53 which the court stated left the clear inference that a suit against the uninsured motorist to determine legal liability
was not a condition precedent to recovery on the policy, it was held that
33

The arbitration clause of the coverage is extensively examined in: Arbitra-

tion: Uninsured Motorist Provision, MARQ. L. REv. (1970).
N.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 100 (1967).

34 270

35 269 N.C. 265, 152 S.E.2d 102 (1967).
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the insured could maintain an action on the contract without prior suit
against the uninsured motorist.
Prior to either North Carolina decision a federal district court, in
Hickey v. Insurance Co. of North America,3 6 was faced with the issue
of whether or not suit against the uninsured motorist was a condition
precedent to recovery against the uninsured motorist carrier where
state law had invalidated the compulsory arbitration provisions. In
Hickey the insured's minor son, who had been playing with friends
next to the road, attempted to cross the street when he was struck by
an uninsured motorist. The insured brought an action against the insurance carrier, alleging that the cause of the accident was the sole
negligence of the uninsured, rather than first obtaining a judgment
against the motorist and then bringing suit against the insurance company. The insurer objected to the suit on grounds that the plaintiff had
not yet established the legal liability of the uninsured motorist, or in the
alternative, had not submitted to arbitration.
Because the laws of Tennessee prohibited arbitration of disputes
where a minor was a party in interest, the court held that the compulsory arbitration provision was invalid in this particular case. The court
then turned to an earlier decision handed down in the Eastern District
of Arkansas which had held that the insurance policy did not provide
the procedure to be followed in determining legal liability where the
insurer and the insured could not agree and the compulsory arbitration
clause was invalid." In Wortman the court held that it appeared from
the policy that the parties intended to determine the issues between
themselves, therefore, the best procedure to follow would to be to
allow the insured to sue the insurance company in a court of law
rather than sue the uninsured motorist, be awarded a judgment, then
bring an action against the insurance company."'
B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Although the uninsured motorist endorsement is clear as to what
must be established before the insured may recover or the insurer is
36 239 F.Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
37
Wortman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 227 F.Supp. 460 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
38 But see Rogers v. United Service Auto. Ass., 410 F.2d 598 (6 Cir. 1969).
(Insured claims that the uninsured motorist was at fault and the uninsured
motorist claimed the insured was at fault, thus establishing a real issue between the two drivers. The insurance company gave its consent to the insured to sue the uninsured motorist, however, the insured, without demanding arbitration, brought suit against his insurer. The insurer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the insured had no cause of action against
the company until establishing the liability of the uninsured motorist in a
suit against such party, since the company had given its consent to such
suit. Under Arkansas law, the compulsory arbitration provision was invalid,
thus the trial court, relying on Wortnan and Hickey denied the insurer's
motion. The court of appeals reversed, distinguishing Wortran and Hickey
on the grounds that the insurer had not given its consent to sue in those
cases, therefore the insurance company in the case at bar either had to
initially sue the uninsured motorist to establish legal liability or arbitrate.
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liable, there are no provisions indicating who has the burden of proving
those facts which would either entitle the insured to recover or the
insurer to deny liability. As a result, the courts will have to establish
rules delegating the burden of proof, or trial judges and arbitrators
will be left with the choice of following present evidentiary rules in
tort and contract actions or of adopting whatever rules they would
prefer in any particular case. Generally there would be very few problems in proving the non-existence of liability insurance on the part of
the alleged tortfeasor, compliance with conditions of the policy, or that
the accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. The filing requirements of financial responsibility
laws will provide prima facie proof of the absence of liability insurance,
while recent court decisions requiring the insurer to show prejudice
where the insured has not complied with conditions of the policy have
effectively transferred the burden to come forward with the evidence
to the insurer. 40
1. Possible Allocations.
a. Allocation according to the rules applicable in an action on a
contract. If the insured is making his claim for recovery upon the
contract, then, according to the general rules of evidence, he has the
burden of establishing that he has complied with all of the conditions
precedent of the contract. The basic condition precedent to the uninsured
motorist endorsement is that the insured is legally entitled to recover
against the uninsured motorist, i.e., that he was free of contributory
negligence, that the uninsured motorist was negligent and that the injuries suffered by the insured, if any, were the proximate result of
such negligence. In addition, the insured has to prove that the motorist
was uninsured, that he was operating, using or performing maintenance
work on such vehicle at the time of the accident, and that the insured
had complied with the contract provisions requiring notice and cooperation.
b. Allocating the burden of proof of any one of the ultimate facts
to either party in various combinations. The second alternative available is to split the burden of proof of each fact in issue in any one of
six possible combinations. 41 Which combination should be adopted
39About the only questions which may occur with any regularity would be the
case where the negligent motorist's insurer becomes insolvent subsequent to
the accident, but prior to the insured's recovery, or where the liability insurer
denies liability. Not only questions of facts are raised by these issues, but
also questions of law and the court will probably decide the issues presented.
0
4 See Comment, The Corporation Clause in Automobile Liability Insurance
Policies, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 434 (1968); Comment, The Requirements and

Effects of the Notice Condition in the Automobile Liability Insurance Policy,

MARQ. L. REv. 366 (1967).
4'For example, assume that there are only three facts disputed: fault of the
insured, fault of the uninsured, and damages (those facts most often in dis-
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could be based on several considerations, one being that they be divided
in a manner comparable to the division in a tort action as if the insured
were bringing the action against the uninsured driver. The burden
could be upon the party in the most beneficial position to prove the
fact, or divided in a manner that would favor compensation, but provide a check against fraud. The latter would certainly be the most
flexible alternative.
c. Allocating the burden of proof of each ultimate fact which could
be -a basis for denial or recovery. The third alternative would be to

place the entire burden of proof or burden to come forward with the
evidence upon the insurer before the insurer can deny the claim of the
insured. This alternative does not seem to be either a practical or
equitable allocation because of its rigidity and the opportunity it creates
42
for fraudulent claims.
2. Is the Problem only Academic Where Arbitration is Pursued?
Widiss suggests that the problem may only be academic where the
parties attempt to resolve their differences by arbitration. 43 Such result
flows from the power of the arbiter to disregard either common law
pute in a tort action where the alleged tortfeasor was insured), the burden
of proof of the facts could be grouped together as follows:
Burden on Insured
Burden on Insurer
1. Fault of uninsured
Damages
Freedom of Contributory
Negligence
2. Fault of uninsured
Contributory negligence
Damages
3. Freedom of Contributory
Lack of fault upon part
Negligence
of the uninsured
Damages
Lack of fault upon
part
of uninsured
5. Fault of uninsured
Damages
Contributory fault of
the insured
6. Freedom from Contributory
Damages
Fault
Lack of fault upon part
of uninsured
42 For exaliple, the insurer could argue that since he was actually involved, and
since he knows the extent of his injuries, it would be better to allocate the
burden to the insured. While the insured would argue that the costs of
meeting such burden can only be handled by the insurance company.
Widiss proposes that:
(I)t seems desirable to provide the insured with some advantage by
placing the burden of proof and/or persuasion on the insurance company.
It should be recognized that such an allocation does not change the character of this insurance, nor does it affect in any way the terms of coverage.
Such an allocation of the burden of proof and/or persuasion only favors
the insured in those instances where the insurance company cannot
produce sufficient evidence to show that the insured was responsible for
the accident. In any case where the insurance company can prove that
the insured-claimant was at fault, there would be no recovery. Thus,
by shifting the burden of proof to the insurer, compensation is assured
in those areas when neither side has sufficient evidence to convince the
trier of fact.
WiDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 44 (1969).
43 Id. at 42.
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or statutory rules of evidence. The results of a survey of 180 arbiters
conducted by the University of Chicago Law School44 showed that the
arbitrators believed, almost unanimously, that both parties should share
the burden of proof, at least in some cases. However 75% of the arbiters
believed that ultimately the burden should fall with the party claiming
the existence of the particular fact in issue.45
3. Appellate Decisions Allocating the Burden of Proof or the
Burden of Persuasion.
Very few cases have faced the issue as to what the proper allocation of proof or persuasion is in a suit or arbitration hearing by the insured against the insurer brought to recover under the Uninsured
Motorist endorsement. The decisions that have discussed allocation
have only mentioned that the insurer or insured had the burden to
establish the disputed fact. When used as authority, the decisions are
always subject to the attack that the pronouncement was only "dicta"
and therefore not binding or indicative of what the law should be.46
In Hill v. SeaboardFire & Marine Insurance Co.,47 discussed supra,
the insurer alleged on appeal that the trial court erroneously found that
the plaintiff had sustained his burden of proving that the other driver
was in fact an uninsured motorist. The court agreed with the defendant to the extent that the plainsiff did have the burden showing that the
motorist was in fact an uninsured motorist, that the uninsured motorist
was liable, that the insured's injuries and damages were the proxi44See Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration,61 COLUmBIA L. REV. 846 (1961).
45 From this Widiss argues that the insurance company using an endorsement

calling for arbitration has in effect abandoned the traditional allocations that
probably would have been adhered to in the judicial process and therefore,
in a particular case, "if there are sufficiently cogent and compelling reasons
to warrant a different approach" the traditional allocation should not prevail.
WmDiss, note 49 supra,at 42.
46 In Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, 226 So. 2d 119 (Fla. App.
1969) the insured introduced into evidence records of the Financial Responsibility Division and the office of the Insurance Commissioner which
showed that the tortfeasor was uninsured at the time of the accident. The
trial court granted the defendant-insurer's motion for directed verdict when
it was proved that the tortfeasor was using a Virginia operator's license but the
vehicle operated by the tortfeasor was registered in Florida. The insurer
argued that the insured failed to prove that the tortfeasor had no liability
insurance issued to him in Virginia; therefore, he had not met his burden
of proof. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the insured had established a prima facie case and, therefore, the insurer had the burden to come
forward with the evidence. The Court, however, did not discuss the question
of who, in fact, has the burden of proof or what degree of proof is required.
But see Dalton v. Allstate Insurance Co., 234 So. 2d 455 (Ga. App. 1970)
where it was held that the insured has the burden of proving the causal
negligence of the tortfeasor and that such tortfeasor was uninsured. The
court relied upon contract rules to determine who had the burden:
"(I)n accordance with the general rules relating to the burden of proof
in civil actions, the burden in an action on an insurance contract is on
the plaintiff (insured) to establish every fact in issue which is essential
to his cause of action, and that his claim is within the policy coverage..."
(Citations omitted)
47374 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. App. 1963).
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mate result of negligent conduct of the uninsured motorist. No mention was made as to whether the insured had to prove that she was
free of contributory negligence, or that a claim of contributory negligence was a defense to the action and therefore required to be established by the insurer.

48

In the interest of protecting state uninsured motorist funds, the
courts may allocate the entire burden of proof of the ultimate facts
to the injured claimant by interpreting the scope of the language "legally entitled to recover" as going beyond the mere retention of the fault
principle. This result is illustrated by DeLuca v. MVAIC, 49 where the
court stated that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" means that in
order to obtain an arbitrable award against MVAIC, the insured party
must prove those facts which he would have had to establish had he proceeded against the uninsured motorist: (1) the negligence of the uninsured motorist; (2) the extent of the insured's damages; and (3) the
claimant's own freedom from contributory negligence.
The problem centering around the allocation of the burden of proof
probably is more imagined and academic than real. If it is merely academic, then the insurance companies will have the tendency to leave
the policy language as is and back away from amending the policy in
order to resolve the question as to the burden of proof. This policy
is a result of the insurance industry's reluctance to amend policy language for fear that the liberal courts will interpret any change as one
made for the purpose of greater compensation for the insured.
C. ComparativeNegligence.
In jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence, 50 a question may arise as to the scope of the phrase "legally
entitled to recover." Under the comparative negligence doctrine, the
plaintiff, even though he may have been negligent and such negligence
was a proximate cause of his injuries, may recover in an action against
a tortfeasor. An argument may exist in such jurisdictions contending
that the scope of the phrase "legally entitled" requires only that the
insured demonstrate that his negligence was of a degree which would
not bar him from recovery against the uninsured motorist, 51 and that

it does not extend further to limit the amount he may recover. There48See, Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914;

Hernandez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 679 (La. App.

1966).
17 N.Y2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966).
See Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1967).
51 In jurisdictions such as Wisconsin which have adopted the "50% rule" the
plaintiff may recover if his negligence is less than the defendant's; New
Hampshire provides that the plaintiff can recover if his negligence is equal
to or less than the defendant's, N.H. Laws of 1969, ch. 225; Mississippi has
adopted the pure comparative negligence rule, where if the defendant is at
all negligent the plaintiff can recover; see Ghiardi and Hogan, Comparative
Negligence-The Wisconsin Rule and Procedure, 18 D. L. J. 537 (1969.

49
50
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fore, if he is "legally entitled to recover," he may recover all of his damages without any deductions, up to the policy limits, from his insurer.
A more reasonable construction of the policy provisions would limit
recovery to:
"... all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be

legally entitled to recover as damages...
The insuring agreement does not promise to pay the insured for all
of his damages arising out of personal injuries because he could successfully maintain an action against the uninsured motorist, but rather
to pay the insured the total amount he would have been entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist, which includes a set-off based on
his degree of negligence.
No reported case has considered the above arguments; in fact, no
case has made any comment about comparative negligence other than
to mention that a different result might occur in a comparative negligence state as opposed to a contributory negligence state in regard to
when the insured is "legally entitled to recover."-,2
D. Immunities.
It would be ironic if a concept as new as Uninsured Motorist coverage could be frustrated by "outmoded vestiges of antique law arising
out of historical origins that long since have passed away and been
forgotten . . .-53 The concept of immunities do threaten just such a
result. An obvious argument exists in favor of an insurer to bar recovery where its insured has been injured by an uninsured motorist who
was immune from suit notwithstanding his failure, since the insured
could not have recovered a judgment against the tortfeasor. Therefore,
he is not entitled to recover under the provisions of an endorsement
which is dependant upon the insured being "legally entitled" to recover
from the uninsured tortfeasor.
Noland v. FarmersInsurance Exchange54 is the only reported case

in which such an argument was made by the carrier. Farmers has issued
a policy of insurance covering the vehicle the plaintiff was occupying.
The plaintiff's husband, an uninsured motorist, was driving an automobile which had collided with the insured vehicle. The plaintiff brought an
action under the Uninsured Motorist provision to recover damages as a
result of the accident. The insurer denied liability on the grounds that
since the plaintiff could not maintain an action against her husband
under Missouri law, she could not recover against the insurer-she was
not "legally entitled to recover" her damages against the uninsured
motorist. The court agreed with the insurer.
Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969).
§ 85 (3d ed. 1964).
54 413 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1967).

52

53 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS,

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

This case, howeveir, may have limited application because of the special language in the policy:
To pay all sums determined to be payable as provided below,
which the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
would be legally responsible to pay as damages to the insured
because of bodily injuries sustained by the insured . . .
This language is not the same as the language in the standard uninsured
motorist endorsement. This fact is important when considering the Noland decision because the court held that the language in that particular
policy clearly indicated that the insured could recover only the amount
she could recover from her husband.
The value of Noland as authority is subject to another limitation.
At the time of the accident there was no Uninsured Motorist Coverage
statute applicable. Today most states have adopted Uninsured Motorist Coverage statutes which have been construed to require that
the insurer, under its uninsured motorist provisions, afford the same
protection to the person injured in an accident caused by an uninsured
motorist as if the tortfeasor was an insured under a liability policy
providing minimum limits coverage. Prosser has noted that where
there is liability insurance available, it is more difficult to maintain the
stock arguments against abrogation of the immunity doctrine. Some
courts have, in fact, refused to recognize the existence of the immunity
where coverage otherwise existed.55
Several arguments can be made against the result in Noland. First,
it may be argued that an immunity is more analogous to a personal
defense and operates to bar recovery only against a particular individual, and not against parties who have no relationship to that party,
but are liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The insurer has
no contractual or other personal relationship with the uninsured motorist which could entitle him to use this personal defense. In fact, if any
relationship exists, it is as an adversary because the insurance company
is subrogated to the rights of its insured. Therefore the insurer cannot
interpose the defense of immunity.
Second, "legally entitled" merely indicates that the conduct of the
uninsured motorist must be shown to be negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the insured's injuries. Since the doctrine of immunities does not affect the character of the negligent acts of
the possessor, such as the doctrine of privilege, but only bars recovery
where the immunity exists, the insured, if he can prove that the uninsured motorist was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries, may recover under the Uninsured Motorist
endorsement, notwithstanding the existence of the immunity. 56
5 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 116 (3d ed. 1964).
56 This argument is based on the same principles used to argue that in a claim
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E. Statute of Limitations.

In only one area of the law has there been a substantial amount of
litigation and dispute involving the scope of "legally entitled to recover."
The bisic issue raised is whether a party who carries uninsured motorist insurance must demand arbitration or commence an action against
the insurer within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury (tort) actions, or avail himself of the longer
time period provided by the statute of limitations applicable to contract
claims.
Because the language of the standard endorsement is silent as to
time limitations, the insurer has had to rely upon the language "legally
entitled to recover" to avoid application of the contract prescription
period.
1. Arguments.
a. Tort period should apply. Three reasons have been advanced
by the insurance industry for requiring the application of the tort
prescription period to claims made against the insurer on the Uninsured
Motorist endorsement.

57

(1) Where the time period for the commencement of a tort action
against the uninsured motorist has run, the insured cannot maintain an
action against the Uninsured Motorist insurance carrier because the
precedent condition-that the insured be "legally entitled" to recover
his damages from the uninsured motorist-has not, and cannot occur.
(2) Because the insurer's liability and the insured's claim is based
on the offending motorist's tort, the considerations upon which the
shorter tort statute of limitations is based should control the insured's
rights.
(3) The insured's failure to promptly demand arbitration or comagainst the uninsured motorist insurance carrier, the contract statute of limitations applies rather than the tort state of limitations. See Infra, 33.
57These arguments have been put forward in a substantial number of cases
and have been discussed extensively in several articles and publications. The
following material is not a complete bibliography, but it is representative of
the material available. Cases: Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Wis.
2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969) ; Thomas v. Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 208
So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1968), reversed, 253 La. 531, 218 So. 2d 584 (1969):
Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580, affirming 197
So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1967); Fremin v. Collings, 194 So. 2d 470 (La. App.
1967); Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (Fla. App.
1968) ; Schulz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Ohio Misc. 83, 244 N.E.2d 546 (1968) ;
DeLuca v. MVAIC, 17 N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482 (1966); Schleif v. Hardware Dealer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 404 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. 1966); Articles:
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 580 (1969); J. Laufer, Insurance Against Lack of
Insurance? A Dissent From the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1969 DUxE
L. J. 227 (1969) ; H. Kuvin, Uninsured Motorist Proceedings Of: Statute of
Limitations; Survival of Actions Act; Wrongful Death Act; Subrogation
Rights, 29 INs. CouN. J. 127 (1962); H. Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 12 Cr.EV-MAR L. REv. 67 (1963) ; A. Widiss, Perspectives On Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 N.W. L. R51. 497 (1967-68); A. WrDiss, A
GUmE TO UNINSSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, §§ 2.22-2.26 (1969).
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mence suit against the insurer would frustrate the insurer's right of
subrogation against the negligent motorist.
b. Contract period should apply. Those who argue that the contract
statute should apply generally do so by attacking the three arguments
of the insurer, or by attempting to define the nature of the action or
the defenses available to the insurance company.
1) Nature of the action. In an action against the insurer liability
arises solely from the contract and not from a breach of any common
law duty to refrain from tortious injury to a person. 58 The duties of the
insurance company are found in its promises appearing in the insurance
contract. To apply a tort statute of limitations to an action on a contract
merely to preserve evidence concerning the automobile accident59 cannot be justified.
2) Defenses available to the insurer. The insurance company
cannot use procedural defenses which would have been available to the
uninsured motorist in an action by the insured against the uninsured
motorist. These defenses are personal defenses which operate to bar
recovery only against a particular individual, and not against parties
who have no relationship to that party, but are liable for the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff. The insurer has no contractual or other personal relationship with the uninsured motorist which could entitle him to
use this personal defense. In fact, if any relationship does exist, it is
as an adversary because the insurance company is subrogated to the
rights of its insured. 60 Furthermore, the obligations of the insurance
company arise under a contract to provide first party benefits to its
insured. It cannot claim that it has stepped into the shoes of the tortfeasor because the obligations arising under a contract are not coextensive with the obligations of the uninsured motorist, but go beyond.
3) 1M1eaning of "legally entitled" limited to fault. Widiss argues
that if the phrase "legally entitled" means only that the insured must
establish that the proximate cause of his injuries was due solely to
negligence of the uninsured motorist, then the only relevant question
is whether the insured had a cause of action at one time against the
irresponsible motorist. It would be immaterial whether or not a cause
58 Schleif v. Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 404 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. 1966). But
see Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 242 F.Supp. 788 (E.D. Va. 1965) where
the federal court held, for purpose of diversity of citizenship, an action
against "John Doe" (Virginia's special procedure for suing a hit-and-run
driver no found) is an action in tort, and therefore, the uninsured motorist
insurance carrier is not an interested party and the diversity can not be based
on the company's residency.
59Admittedly it is a more difficult task to preserve evidence concerning an
accident than preserving evidence surrounding a contract because the most
effective evidence in the tort claim comes from human memories and changing environment while the contract is easily preserved on paper.
60 Application of Travelers Indem. Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1962) ; But see Application of Nationwide Ins. Co., 39 Misc.2d 782, 241 N.Y.S.2d 589, 592 (1962) :
"By the insurance policy petitioner stands in the shoes of the hit-and-run
driver for the purpose of determining whether it will be liable to respondents."
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of action against the uninsured motorist was barred by the statute of
limitations at the time the insured made his claim under the Uninsured
Motorist endorsement in a automobile policy issued to him.6 1
4) Fallacy of the insurer'ssubrogation argument. A party who is
uninsured is more than likely to be financially irresponsible. Any judgment against such a party would probably have less value than the
costs of the subrogation suit. Not only is a judgment worthless, but the
uninsured motorist has to be located or proved to be within the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is commenced, which may be a
rare occurrence. Therefore, it would appear imprudent to limit the
possibility of compensation to an innocent individual upon a contract
of indemnity insurance, merely because the insurer, by reason of a
procedural bar, cannot maintain an action which, almost universally,
is worthless anyway.u If the company is in fact concerned about its
subrogation rights, then
[T]he company has a more than sufficient position from which
to protect its subrogation rights without relying on the insured
to protect its position by either having the insured present a
claim or initiate an action against the uninsured motorist ...
Rather than allowing the insurer to use the running of the tort
statute of limitations as a shield, it would seem far more sensible to require that in such a case the insurer should be obligated
to keep track of the dates and make sure that both its own and
its client's right against the uninsured motorist are not lost by the
failure to initiate an action before the statute has run.6 3
5) Uninsured Motorist claim does not "sound in tort." Implied
in several of the insurer's arguments for holding that the tort prescription period should apply is the premise that the suit is an action which
"sounds in tort" because the elements of a tort must be established.
However, an action which "sounds in tort" is an action whereby the
defendant has a "double liability"-one in contract and one in tort. The
only relation of the uninsured motorist claim to such is the necessity of
fault-the insurer has committed no tort and could not be held liable
in a tort action against it. Therefore, any consideration based on the
stated or implied premise that the action against the insurance company
"sounds in tort" is erroneous.14
61

WiDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST CoVERAGE, §

2.23(1) (1969).

62 Laufer, InsuranceAgainst Lack of Insurance? A Dissent From the Uninmred

Motorist Endorsement, 1969 DUKE L. J. 227 (1969). (At end of 1967, New
York's
MVAIC had only recovered 2.6 cents for each dollar it paid out);

63

64

WiDiss, A GUIDE To UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, § 2.23(2) (1969).
WiDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 51 (1969). As to Widiss'

final suggestion in this quote, see Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(i) note 82 infra.
H. Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist Coverage,
12 CLv-MAR L. R F v. 67
(963) ; The author proposes a caveat-If the arbitration clause is not to be
given effect under state laws, then the tort prescription period would have
to apply since action must be brought against the uninsured motorist to
establish the right to collect under the coverage. See discussion on the effect
of the invalidity of compulsory arbitration, supra, 18.
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2. Sahloff v.Western Casualty & Surety Company
The latest case considering the question of which statute of limitations applies is Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. 65 In Sahloff
the plaintiff commenced a suit against his insurer, Western Casualty,
to recover for bodily injuries allegedly caused by an uninsured motorist,
five years and eleven months after the date of the accident. The defendant demurred on the ground that the cause of action sounded in tort
and was subject to the three year statute of limitations prescribed by
Wisconsin Statute § 983.205 (1) (1967). The trial court overruled the
insurer's demurrer to the complaint.
On appeal, the appellant-insurer presented the three arguments discussed above:
(1)Because the tort statute of limitations has run and barred
any suit against the uninsured motorist, the insured consequently
has no rights under the terms of the endorsement requiring that
he be "legally entitled to recover";
(2) That the insured's claim for injuries is based upon the negligent tort of the uninsured motorist and therefore possesses the
character of that action in tort; and
(3) That once the tort statute of limitations has run, the insurance company is foreclosed from exercising its subrogation rights
against the uninsured motorist as provided in the endorsement
and it is unfair to allow recovery against it.
The supreme court rejected all three of the insurer's arguments in an
opinion which cited many of the leading decisions and articles which
had considered the issue in any substantial detail.
In rejecting the insurer's first argument the court commented that
it "seems hardly appropriate," 66 since the issue was which statute of
limitations applied, and not whether a cause of action existed against
the uninsured motorist. However, the court did answer the "merits"
of the argument:
[T]he phrase "legally entitled to recover" raises the question of
whether the insured needs to have only a cause of action against
the uninsured motorist or whether his claim must also be enforceable at the time of his suit against his insurer. We think the
phrase was used only to keep the fault principle as a basis for
recovery against the insurer .. ."
The court further noted that the purpose of the coverage provided by
statute 8 and the standard endorsement (both of which contain the
phrase "legally entitled") was to provide compensation for an innocent victim's injuries, not to provide free liability insurance for an
uninsured motorist. "Therefore," the court argued that:
65 45 Wis. 2d 60, 171 N.W.2d 914 (1969).
66 Id. at 68, 171 N.W.2d at 917.
67 Id. at 69, 171 N.W.2d at 917. (emphasis added).
68 WIs. STAT.

§

204.30(5) (1967).
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[I]t is neither necessary under the coverage nor desirable
public policy to place the indemnity insurer in exactly the same
position of a liability insurer of an uninsured motorist.69
Nor was the court "sympathetic" with the insurer's second argument which it described as only another phase of the argument that
the insurance company is to be put in the shoes of the uninsured motorist, an argument rejected above. The court clearly indicated that the
action by the insured against the insurer, whether it be by judicial
process or arbitration, "is an action on the policy and sounds in contract"70 even though the insured must prove the causal negligence of
the uninsured motorist.
The final argument of the insured, involving loss of subrogation
rights, fared not better than the first two arguments. The court agreed
with Widiss and Laufer7 1 on the point that the insurer's subrogation
rights are "not worth much," but if the insurer wanted to protect those
rights, under the endorsement he could compel the insured to commence
an action, either before or after payment, against the uninsured motorist
and thereby preserve its claim.
3. Legislative Enactments Limiting Time to Make a Claim
Under the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement.
In at least one state, California,72 the legislature has set special time
limitations upon the insured in which he can take action to perfect his
claim against his insurer. By making a formal demand for arbitration,
settling with the insurer, or instituting a suit against the uninsured
motorist within one year from the date of the accident the insured can
toll the running of the statute. The California courts are enforcing this
section even in unusual circumstances, as evidenced by Firemen's In73
surance Co. v. Diskin.
In Diskin the insureds, California residents, were injured when the
taxi in which they were riding crashed into a fire hydrant in Miami,
Florida. Fourteen months later the taxi company's insurer became insolvent, a fact which the insureds had not become aware of until twentytwo months after the accident. Two months after learning of the insolvency, the plaintiffs commenced arbitration proceedings to recover
their damages. Firemen's then brought an action for declaratory relief
against the insureds, one of the grounds being that the insureds were
69 Sahloff v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 45 Wis. 2d at 70, 171 N.W.2d at 918.
7 Id. at 70, 171 N.W.2d at 918.
71 See note 66, supra.
72 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(i) Limitation of actions

(i) No cause of action shall accrue to the insured under any policy or
endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless within one
one year from the date of the accident:
(1) Suit for bodily injury has been filed against the uninsured motorist,
in a court of competent jurisdiction, or
(2) Agreement as to the amount due under the policy has been concluded, or
(3) The insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings.
73255 Cal. App.2d 503, 63 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1967).
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barred in the making of their claim under section 11580.2 of the California Insurance Code. The court agreed and held that the arbitration
proceedings were invalid.
California has since eased the harshness of the Diskin decision by
amending the Code to provide that the insurance company must give
30 days notice to its insured prior to the running of the statute of
limitation; failure to comply with this requirement tolls the running
74

of the statutory period.

IV.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of one area involving disputes centered around
the meaning and scope of the language "legally entitled to recover,"
a minimal amount of case law has developed. This may be due to
various factors-either the questions are only academic or the language
of the endorsement has not been in existence for a period of time necessary to develop a substantial body of case law. Whatever the reason,
the public is still not satisfied with the present system of automobile
accident reparations. This dissatisfaction has been indicated by several
surveys,7 5 Congressional action, and the introduction of new automobile
accident reparation plans.
Congressional action began on January 26, 1967, when Senator
Thomas Dodd (D Conn) introduced a bill calling for the establishment
of a Federal Motor Vehicle Insurance Guaranty Corporation.76 This
bill recommended the establishment of a program similar to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation for the protection of those whose
insurers become insolvent. A half year later, on June 30, 1967,
Representatives Peter Rodino, Jr. (D NJ) and William Cahill (R
NJ) sent a joint letter to Emmanuel Celler (D NY), Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and its Antitrust Subcommittee, calling for
an investigation of automobile insurance business practices.Y After
three months, the Committee issued a 183-page report indicting the
automobile industry and the tort-fault system.
During the Antitrust Subcommittee's study, Senator Warren Magnuson (D Wash), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee and
Representatives John Moss (D Cal), member of the House Commerce
74 CAL. INS. CODE

§ 11580.2(j) Notice of Limitation of actions

(j) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (i), any insurer whose

insured has made a claim under his or her uninsured motorist coverage, and
such claim is pending, shall, at least 30 days before the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitation, notify its insured in writing of the statute
of limitations applicable to such injury or death. Failure of the insurer to
provide such written notice shall operate to toll any applicable statute of
limitation or other time limitation for a period of 30 days from the date
of such written notice is actually given.
75 For example see, O'Connell and Wilson, Car Insurance and Consumer Desires (1969) where a survey taken under the supervision of the authors is
analyzed and discussed.
76 S 688, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 Cong. Rec. pt. 2 at 1667-70 (1967).
77 H. R. Rep. No. 815 at 1 (90th Cong. 1st Sess. Oct. 24, 1967).
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Committee, began conferring with the then Secretary of Transportation,
Alan Boyd. Out of this action on December 14, 1967, came House
joint Resolution 958 and Senate Joint Resolution 129, calling for a
two million dollar study by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
of the entire automobile reparations system. After several hearings on
the Resolutions, they were signed into law and a 1.6 million dollar
appropriation was given to DOT so it could complete its work and
report its recommendations to the President and Congress by May,
197078
In addition to the government studies and investigations, several
compensation plans have been introduced by private individuals and
associations. The most notable are:
(1) Basic Protection Plan for the Traffic VictimProfessors Keeton and O'Connell;
(2) Personal Protection Automobile Insurance PlanAmerican Insurance Association (AIA); and
(3) Responsible ReformDefense Research Institute (DRI)
The environment which forced the introduction of the Uninsured
Motorist endorsement during the years of 1954-56 has been duplicated
(only in larger scale) today. It is evident that a change will be made.
The change may maintain the fault principle. However, if that principle is maintained, the compensation benefits will be liberalized. To
accomplish this liberalization, it is this author's opinion that the Uninsured Motorist endorsement will be replaced by its obvious successor,
the "Under-insured Motorist Protection Plan," which would guarantee
the same amount of coverage for the benefit of the insured as his liability
endorsement provides for the benefit of parties injured by his negligence.
TiaOMAS E. GREENWALD

by Edward C. Germain, June 26, 1969. At the time of this paper, Mlay
9, 1970, the DOT Report had not yet been issued.
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